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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
In this second appeal of a federal sentence arising out of 
a prisoner's assault on a prison employee, we must again 
consider whether a prison cook supervisor is a "corrections 
officer" for purposes of a three-level "Official Victim" 
enhancement under United States Sentencing Guidelines 
S 3A1.2(b). For the defendant, the consequences of such an 
enhancement are great, and hence (as is always the case) 
we treat the legal issues raised by this matter with 
seriousness. That said, we do not denigrate this appeal by 
observing that the public might well wonder whether federal 
judges do not have more important things to do than to 
write the eighteen page opinion necessary to decide this 
essentially pedestrian question. If Congress would amend 
the Sentencing Guidelines Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C.S 994 et 
seq., so as to enable the Sentencing Commission to afford 
federal judges additional sentencing discretion, such efforts 
could be avoided. If it does not, we can look forward to 
decades more in which the dockets of the federal courts will 
be glutted with such esoteric exercises, the energies of 
district court and appellate judges sapped, and the Federal 
Reporters filled with one tome after another on issues as 
banal as whether a cook supervisor is a corrections officer.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. A rough survey, based on a Westlaw search, suggests that in the last 
twelve months 2053 opinions of the Courts of Appeals have involved 
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The subject of this opinion is the Defendant, Lawyer Lee 
Walker. Walker is a federal inmate who worked in the 
kitchen at the United States Penitentiary at Lewisburg, 
Pennsylvania (USP-Lewisburg), and who, soon after he was 
notified that he would be transferred from that job, 
assaulted his former boss David Wadeck, a prison cook 
supervisor. In the case at the bar, we must determine 
whether Wadeck was a corrections officer and whether 
Walker knew or had reasonable cause to believe that 
Wadeck was a corrections officer, such that a three-level 
sentence enhancement under S 3A1.2(b) was appropriate. 
The panel hearing Walker's first appeal defined the term 
"corrections officer" for us and did so narrowly. The prior 
panel focused on whether the victim was titled a corrections 
officer, whether he spent a significant amount of time 
guarding prisoners, and whether he was guarding prisoners 
at the time he was assaulted. See United States v. Walker, 
149 F.3d 238, 242 (3d Cir. 1998). The District Court 
resentencing Walker applied this definition and found the 
Official Victim enhancement appropriate. 
 Although, with the benefit of hindsight, one could argue 
that the prior panel's definition of the term corrections 
officer is unduly narrow, we are, needless to say, bound by 
it. Accordingly, our task is limited to assessing whether the 
District Court resentencing Walker applied that definition 
correctly. Because we find that Wadeck was not titled a 
corrections officer, and that the record does not support 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
sentencing guidelines issues. It would not be necessary to eliminate the 
sentencing guidelines to alleviate this problem. Widening the allowable 
guideline ranges might make it possible to reduce the Internal Revenue 
Code-like network of enhancements and adjustments. See Suggestions 
for the Sentencing Commission, 8 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 10, 11 
(July/August 1995). The Commission would also be well served to pay 
better attention to the way courts apply the guidelines and to responding 
to courts' (and others') frustrations with the guidelines' overly 
mechanical characteristics. See Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in 
the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of 
Sentencers, 101 Yale L.J. 1681, 1750-51 (1992). For an incisive criticism 
of the guidelines scheme, in general, and suggestions for reform, see 
generally Kate Stith & Jose Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing 
Guidelines in Federal Courts (1998). 
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either the conclusion that Wadeck spent significant time 
guarding prisoners or that he was engaged in the act of 
guarding prisoners when he was struck by Walker, we hold 
that the District Court erred as a matter of law in 
enhancing Walker's sentence. That said, because a broader 
definition of corrections officer seems to us to be more 
consonant with the purpose of the "Official Victim" 
enhancement, we urge the Sentencing Commission to 
revisit S 3A1.2(b) and the application notes accompanying 
it, thereby obviating the uncertainty that led to the prior 
panel's rendering. 
 
I. 
 
Lawyer Lee Walker worked on a food service detail at 
USP-Lewisburg. The penitentiary employed Wadeck as a 
cook supervisor. Wadeck served as Walker's immediate 
supervisor. See infra Subsections II.A.1-3 (describing what 
these supervisory duties entailed). One day during work, 
Donald Reed, the Food Services Supervisor in charge of the 
kitchen, informed Walker that Wadeck found Walker's work 
substandard and that Walker would be transferred to 
another job position. After Walker's meeting with Reed, 
Wadeck "provoked" Walker by calling him a"punk," which 
is an extremely offensive term to prisoners at USP- 
Lewisburg. United States v. Walker, 30 F. Supp. 2d 829, 
831 & n.1 (M.D. Pa. 1998). Incensed, Walker waited 
approximately an hour and then, while Wadeck prepared 
food trays for inmates in the segregation unit, attacked 
Wadeck by striking him from behind with a steel ladle or 
paddle. A struggle ensued during which Walker kicked 
Wadeck several times. Wadeck fended off Walker by pulling 
down Walker's pants. Other correctional staff summoned by 
Wadeck detained Walker. 
 
Walker pled guilty to possession of a prohibited object by 
an inmate, 18 U.S.C. S 1791, and impeding a federal officer, 
19 U.S.C. S 111. The District Court sentenced Walker to 77 
months incarceration, applying a three-level enhancement 
to Walker's offense level under U.S.S.G. S 3A1.2(b). Section 
3A1.2, entitled "Official Victim" provides that 
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       [i]f-- 
 
       . . . 
 
       (b) during the course of the offense or immediate 
       flight therefrom, the defendant or a person for 
       whose conduct the defendant is otherwise 
       accountable, knowing or having reasonable 
       cause to believe that a person was a law 
       enforcement or corrections officer, assaulted 
       such officer in a manner creating a substantial 
       risk of serious bodily injury, 
 
       increase by 3 levels. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 3A1.2(b) (bold in original). 
 
Walker appealed the enhancement. The prior panel 
concluded that, in applying S 3A1.2(b), the District Court 
impermissibly lumped " `all prison employees, who work in 
facilities and frequently interact with inmates' " into the 
smaller subset of individuals referred to as corrections 
officers in S 3A1.2(b). Walker, 149 F.3d at 241 (quoting the 
District Court).2 The panel held that, for purposes of 
S 3A1.2(b), a " `corrections officer' . . . is a person distinct 
from other prison employees." Id. at 242. According to the 
panel, a corrections officer is defined as "[1] any person so 
titled, [2] any person, however titled, who spends significant 
time guarding prisoners within a jail or correctional 
institution or in transit to or from or within a jail or 
correctional institution, and [3] all other persons assaulted 
while actually engaged in guarding prisoners." Id. Because 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The panel held that the term "corrections officer" referred to a class 
of 
individuals distinct from all federal employees at the prison because the 
enhancement provision in S 3A1.2(a) had been amended in 1992 to 
include all "government officer[s] or employee[s]," while S 3A1.2(b) was 
left to include only corrections officers. Walker, 149 F.3d at 241. If 
government officers or employees were not distinct from "corrections 
officer," the panel reasoned, the 1992 amendment would be superfluous. 
See id. The panel found support for this reasoning in other statutory and 
regulatory provisions distinguishing between government employees and 
corrections officers. See id. at 241-42. It also concluded that the plain 
meaning of the term "corrections officer" was inconsistent with the plain 
meaning of the word "employee." See id. at 242. 
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the panel found no evidence that Wadeck fit into any one 
of these three criteria, it reversed and remanded for 
resentencing, suggesting that the District Court conduct 
further fact-finding to see whether Wadeck qualified as a 
corrections officer under S 3A1.2(b) and the panel's 
definition of that term. See id. at 243. 
 
On resentencing, the District Court engaged in the 
suggested fact-finding and made several conclusions of law 
based on the panel's three-part, disjunctive test for 
determining whether Wadeck was a corrections officer. The 
Court first found that Wadeck's job title was not 
"corrections officer," but instead "cook supervisor." 
Accordingly, he did not meet the first criterion of the test. 
The Court next found that "Wadeck routinely supervises 
inmates during their employment, is responsible for 
ensuring that they are present during working hours, and 
is responsible for safety, security and discipline of inmates 
under his supervision." Walker, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 833. The 
Court therefore held that "Wadeck spends significant time 
guarding prisoners within a correctional institution," and 
that he was "assaulted by Walker while actually engaged in 
guarding prisoners." Id. Concluding that the prior panel's 
second and third criteria for qualifying as a corrections 
officer were met, the Court added a three-point 
enhancement to Walker's offense level pursuant to 
S 3A1.2(b). The District Court made no explicit findings 
regarding the mens rea component of the guideline. See 
infra note 11 (discussing the mens rea issue).3 
 
II. 
 
The first issue before us is whether Wadeck was a 
corrections officer, as the prior panel defined that term. 
Specifically, we must decide whether the District Court's 
factual findings and the record at the resentencing hearing 
warranted finding that a cook supervisor such as Wadeck 
spent a significant amount of time guarding prisoners or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The District Court properly exercised jurisdiction over the matter 
under 18 U.S.C. S 1321. We exercise appellate jurisdiction over the final 
judgment of the District Court under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 
S 3742(e)(1). 
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that Wadeck was engaged in the act of guarding prisoners 
at the time Walker attacked him.4 We review de novo the 
District Court's legal conclusions that both of these 
questions should be answered in the affirmative. See United 
States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 190 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting 
that in a federal sentencing appeal " `the District Court's 
findings of facts are measured by the clearly erroneous test, 
but our review of the legal component of its conclusions is 
plenary' ") (citations omitted). 
 
A. 
 
We turn our attention first to whether Wadeck spent a 
significant amount of time guarding prisoners. The prior 
panel did not elaborate on what guarding prisoners means 
or what it understood a significant amount of time to be, 
but it did provide us with certain outer boundaries. The 
panel went to great pains to point out that not all prison 
employees are corrections officers, and that corrections 
officers are a distinct subset of the federal prison employee 
population. See Walker, 149 F.3d at 241-43. 5 Therefore, we 
know that any interpretation of "spends a significant 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The District Court found as a matter of fact that Wadeck's job title 
was not "corrections officer." See Walker, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 833. Neither 
party contests this finding of fact or the legal conclusion that arises 
therefrom; i.e., that Wadeck's job title, by itself, did not place him in 
the 
class of individuals protected by S 3A1.2(b)'s Official Victim 
enhancement. We will not disturb the District Court's finding of fact on 
this matter, which we review for clear error, see United States v. 
Bennett, 
 
161 F.3d 171, 190 (3d Cir. 1998), nor we will revisit the legal conclusion 
that the finding compelled. 
 
5. Examples of the panel's repeated efforts to make this point include 
statements that: (1) The "conclusion that `all prison employees, who work 
in facilities and frequently interact with inmates, fall within the 
protection of 3A1.2(b),' is supported neither by citations to the record 
nor 
by legal authority." Walker, 149 F.3d at 241; (2) "We are convinced that 
a `corrections officer,' as referenced in section 3A1.2(b), is a person 
distinct from other prison employees." Id.  at 242; and (3) " `If 
corrections 
officer' is to have meaning apart from `government employee,' and we 
conclude that it must, then Wadeck is not a corrections officer according 
to this record." Id. at 242-43 (emphasis added). The dissent seems to 
ignore this distinction. 
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amount of time guarding prisoners" that sweeps too many 
individuals employed at a prison into its web is too broad. 
We also know that any interpretation that limits thefield to 
corrections officers so titled is too narrow. 
 
Beginning with these two outer boundaries, we turn to 
the common meanings of the word "guard" and the phrase 
"spends a significant amount of time."6 Webster's defines 
the verb "to guard" as "to protect from danger," "to 
accompany for protection," and to watch over so as to 
prevent escape . . . or restrain from violence or 
indiscretion." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 
UNABRIDGED 1007 (1966). Additionally, Webster's defines the 
adjective "significant" as "deserving to be considered: 
IMPORTANT, WEIGHTY, NOTABLE." Id. at 2116. Referencing 
Webster's sensible common usage, if Wadeck, the cook 
supervisor, is to be a corrections officer for purposes of the 
guideline in question, an important, weighty, or notable 
part of his time working at ESP-Lewisburg must be spent 
protecting people from danger, accompanying them for 
protection, watching over prisoners so as to prevent their 
escape, and/or restraining them from violence or 
indiscretion. Under the prior panel's teaching, cook 
supervisors must spend more time engaged in these 
activities than prison employees generally, but need not 
spend as much time doing these things as corrections 
officers so titled. 
 
With this understanding of the prior panel's second 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The government would have us use the Department of Labor's and the 
Office of Management and Budget's definitions of the term "corrections 
officer" and the several factors contained therein, to determine whether 
Wadeck was a corrections officer for purposes of the sentencing 
guidelines. Although the prior panel relied on these definitions to 
dismiss 
 
the government's previous claim that all prison employees were 
corrections officers, see Walker, 149 F.3d at 241-42 (quoting 1 U.S. 
Dep't of Labor, Dictionary of Occupational Titles 268 (4th ed. rev. 1991); 
Office of Management and Budget's Proposed 1997 Standard 
Occupational Classification Manual (visited July 1, 1998) 
http://stats.bls.gov/soc/soc/_5360.htm>), the panel crafted its own 
definition of the term corrections officer. It is that definition, as the 
law 
of the circuit and of this case, that controls on this appeal, not that of 
the Department of Labor or the Office of Management and Budget. 
 
                                8 
 
 
criterion for a S 3A1.2(b) enhancement in mind, we turn our 
attention to Wadeck's and cook supervisors' various duties 
at USP Lewisburg. We address a cook supervisors' general, 
primary, and security duties in turn, deciding whether 
viewed alone or in concert they place Wadeck and other 
cook supervisors within the scope of the class protected by 
S 3A1.2(b)'s Official Victim enhancement. 
 
1. Wadeck's (and USP-Lewisburg Cook Supervisors') 
       General Duties 
 
Many of the characteristics of Wadeck's job that the 
District Court relied upon at the resentencing hearing to 
enhance Walker's sentence do nothing to distinguish 
Wadeck, or cook supervisors generally, from all other 
employees at USP-Lewisburg. The Court found many facts 
relevant to Wadeck's training, clothing, salary, and 
authority to discipline and detain prisoners, but failed to 
consider whether these facts mean that he engages in 
guarding as compared to other employees. We conclude 
that they do not. 
 
Wadeck received initial correctional techniques training 
when he was hired, and a refresher training in security 
once a year; he was required to maintain proficiency in self- 
defense techniques, firearms, and legal statutes involved in 
correctional management; he was titled a law enforcement 
officer and accordingly received hazard pay and enhanced 
pension benefits because he worked in close proximity to 
prison inmates; and he had the authority and responsibility 
to arrest and detain prisoners and respond to emergency 
situations. As the testimony of those employed at USP- 
Lewisburg and documentary evidence admitted at the 
resentencing hearing shows, however, every employee at 
USP-Lewisburg received such benefits and training, had 
such authority and responsibilities, and was titled a law 
enforcement officer in order to receive enhanced pay and 
benefits.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In concluding that Wadeck guarded prisoners, the District Court also 
relied on the fact that Wadeck wore a nylon belt on which he kept keys, 
a radio with which he could communicate with his supervisors or call in 
assistance, and chits that could be traded in for other equipment. Again, 
many prison employees wore such a belt--some of whom were not 
responsible for guarding prisoners--while others did not--some of whom 
were in fact in charge of guarding prisoners. Wadeck's belt, therefore, 
does not tighten the argument that he guarded prisoners. 
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Because these general duties and job characteristics were 
common to all employees at USP-Lewisburg--from 
corrections officers to cook supervisors to chaplains and 
secretaries--none of these facts place Wadeck, or USP- 
Lewisburg cook supervisors generally, into the subclass of 
prison employees that the prior panel was willing to 
recognize as Official Victims under S 3A1.2(b). If these 
duties and characteristics were to qualify individuals as 
Official Victims, the prior panel's decision would be 
meaningless, because all USP-Lewisburg prison employees 
would be protected by S 3A1.2(b). This is a conclusion the 
prior panel explicitly and repeatedly rejected. See Walker, 
149 F.3d at 241-43; see also supra note 5 (enumerating 
instances in which the panel rejected the conclusion that 
all prison employees qualified as corrections officers under 
the Official Victim enhancement). 
 
2. Wadeck's (and USP-Lewisburg Cook Supervisors') 
       Primary Duties 
 
Similarly, Wadeck's primary duties as a cook supervisor 
do not place him within the guideline's protected class, as 
the prior panel defined the contours of that class. Wadeck 
is charged with supervising inmates who are employees in 
the kitchen area at USP-Lewisburg. As a cook supervisor, 
his "[p]rimary duties" are to supervise and instruct "inmate 
workers in all phases of preparation, presentation and 
timeliness of all food items that are placed on the serving 
line" and to supervise "inmates in the serving of all meals, 
and the sanitation of the department." Position Description, 
Cook Supervisor, Appendix at 119. 
 
To meet these obligations, a cook supervisor such as 
Wadeck receives specialized training in food preparation; he 
trains inmate workers in the art of prison cooking; he 
acquaints them with overall operation of the kitchen; he 
staffs the kitchen and orders equipment and supplies; he 
sets the inmate workers' schedules and sets priorities to 
meet feeding demands and deadlines; he makes sure the 
inmate-employees prepare nutritious and attractive meals 
in a timely and presentable manner; he evaluates his 
inmate employees' performance, reprimanding them or 
recommending that they receive service awards; he pays the 
inmate workers their salaries; he counsels and motivates 
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unwilling or potentially dangerous workers and considers 
security and safety of other when assigning work; and in 
lock-down situations, when inmates are confined to their 
cells, he prepares food. Because the "consequences of a 
failed meal could be disastrous," the cook supervisor "must 
maintain constant vigilance of inmate workers." Id. at 121. 
 
In our view, none of these supervisory duties connote 
"guarding" as the term is normally employed. In contrast, 
we see them as more akin to any manager in a kitchen in 
a restaurant or college cafeteria. In fact, Wadeck's 
supervisor in the food services department described the 
trade-type cook supervisor as one who receives additional 
pay only because he is in frequent contact with inmates. 
This is true, however, of every prison employee, save for 
those who are actually charged to go extra lengths to 
receive their hazard pay. 
 
The government objects to this characterization of 
Wadeck's supervisory duties. It contends in its brief, and 
asserted even more explicitly at oral argument, that any 
time a prison employee at USP-Lewisburg--be it a 
secretary, nurse, cook supervisor, or chaplain--is alone 
with an inmate or supervising an inmate, the employee is 
guarding the inmate. Accordingly, submits the government, 
a cook supervisor, who is often alone with inmates as they 
bake and cook, spends a significant amount of time 
guarding prisoners. 
 
We find this argument--and its conflation of the acts of 
supervising and guarding--unconvincing. As Wadeck's 
testimony at the sentencing hearing established, a cook 
supervisor such as Wadeck performs his multiple 
supervisory tasks in many different parts of the kitchen 
area and dining halls adjoining it. Instead of spending a 
significant amount of time protecting inmates from danger, 
accompanying them for protection, watching over them so 
as to prevent escape, or restraining them from violence or 
indiscretion--as guarding is commonly defined--Wadeck 
moves throughout the prison and in and out of contact with 
different prisoners. This contact mainly consists of making 
sure food is prepared and served properly and in a timely 
manner. To that end, Wadeck spends some of his time by 
the freezers supervising the preparation of common fare 
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trays and cold trays. He then moves to the main kitchen to 
supervise the preparation of other trays for distribution in 
the main line of the dining hall. 
 
Wadeck also works in the bakery, the storeroom, the 
kitchen, the dining hall, the staff dining room, and in front 
of the main kitchen on the serving line. When he is in the 
kitchen with inmates, he is either alone with ten tofifteen 
inmates or with another cook supervisor and as many as 
sixty-five inmates, depending on the shift. Whether he is in 
the kitchen supervising the inmates or away from the 
kitchen leaving the inmates to themselves, the doors to the 
kitchen always remain locked. This movement from station 
to station and task to task is not the work load of someone 
watching over prisoners to prevent violence, escape, and 
indiscretion; again, it seems to be the schedule of a busy 
manager of a large restaurant or cafeteria. While cook 
supervisors monitor the preparation and delivery of food, 
the locks on the kitchen doors and the attractiveness of a 
kitchen job to inmates, as well as the corrections officers, 
so titled, who are posted throughout the prison, perform 
the safeguarding functions the government attributes to all 
prison employees. 
 
If we were to accept the government's argument that any 
time a prison employee was alone with prisoner, he would 
be guarding that prisoner, we would run afoul of the prior 
panel's decision. Put simply, the government's argument 
proves too much. The argument sweeps spiritual advisors 
who spend time alone with penitents, librarians and job 
counselors, secretaries who work in the same offices as 
prisoners, and countless other prison employees into the 
class of people who spend a significant amount of time 
"guarding" prisoners. Modern prisons are huge institutions, 
with large numbers of employees performing a host of job 
descriptions. By equating supervision of job tasks or time 
spent alone with prisoners with the act of guarding, the 
government and the District Court bring us back to the first 
time this Court heard Walker's appeal, where the 
government had argued, and the District Court had found, 
that all prison employees were corrections officers. This, we 
now know, is not the case. 
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In excepting chaplains, secretaries, and cook supervisors 
from the class of people who spend a significant amount of 
time guarding, we do not slice the prior panel's decision too 
thinly. As Robby Wilson, a special investigative agent at 
USP-Lewisburg testified, there were several groups of 
employees at the prison, not titled corrections officers, 
whose jobs seem to us to consist primarily, or at least 
significantly, of guarding. There are lieutenants posted 
throughout the prison who instruct individuals to conduct 
shakedowns;8 security officers, locksmith officers, and 
armory officers who insure the integrity of locks and the 
building; and senior officers, senior officer specialists, 
special investigative agents, and correctional counselors, all 
of whom spend most of their time doing the work of 
correctional officers, even though not titled as such. It is 
these individuals who appear to fall under the prior panel's 
definition of the set of individuals whose job title is not 
corrections officer, but who spend a significant amount of 
their time guarding prisoners. 
 
In contrast, a cook supervisor is concerned with food 
preparation, and a prison chaplain with spiritual guidance. 
Consistent with his duties, a cook supervisor reports to the 
food services administrator. And consistent with their 
guarding duties, the employees described in the preceding 
paragraph report to a captain and an associate warden who 
is in charge of custody. Even though a chaplain or cook 
supervisor may be alone with prisoners as they perform 
their duties, in our view, they cannot be seen as guarding 
prisoners in the way that the aforementioned corrections 
officers, and their counterparts do. Their primary duties 
and responsibilities are simply different in kind. 
 
3. Wadeck's (and USP-Lewisburg Cook Supervisors') 
       Security Obligations 
 
A cook supervisor has certain security obligations specific 
to his station that come closer to the act of guarding than 
do his general and primary duties, but not close enough to 
qualify him as a corrections officer, as the prior panel 
defined the term. According to the District Court's findings 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. According to Wadeck's testimony, "prison foremen" conduct 
shakedowns in the kitchen area. 
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of fact, a cook supervisor must (1) ensure that all inmates 
assigned to work in the kitchen were at their assigned 
station during working hours; (2) track implements such as 
knives, which may be used as weapons; (3) ensure that all 
confined items, such as foods that may be used to ferment 
alcohol, are not removed from the kitchen area; (4) respond 
to emergencies; (5) write reports that may lead to the 
discipline of inmates; and (6) join the staff from other 
departments (including staff members titled corrections 
officers) and gather in the dining hall for purposes of 
security and to make themselves available to inmates with 
problems or complaints. 
 
As mentioned above, the fourth, fifth, and sixth of these 
duties are shared by almost everyone at the prison. Every 
prison employee must respond to inmate fights or 
emergencies, every employee can write up an inmate, and 
most employees gather in the dining hall to supervise 
meals. As Wadeck testified, the write-ups he issues relate to 
employer-employee problems, such as tardiness, insolence 
toward staff, sanitation, and failure to wear safety shoes. 
During meals in the dining hall, he is more concerned with 
the delivery of food to inmates on the serving line. These 
three security duties, therefore, do not demonstrate that 
Wadeck spends a significant amount of time guarding 
prisoners. 
 
The cook supervisor's second and third security duties, 
monitoring the theft of implements that could be used to 
make weapons and food supplies with which the prisoners 
can make alcohol, may have special importance in a prison,9 
but they are comparable to the duty to prevent theft that 
the manager of any restaurant, navy mess hall, or college 
cafeteria would have. Wadeck spends twenty minutes each 
day filling out log sheets, noting that he checked to make 
sure that all of the kitchen's grills, locks, and bars are 
secured, and that all of the knives and potentially 
dangerous tools that were dispensed are returned. This 
clerical monitoring is supplemented by shake-downs of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. To that end, Wadeck received special training aimed at familiarizing 
him with the types of objects that prisoners could use to make weapons 
and alcohol. 
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prisoners and kitchen areas, performed not by cooks 
supervisors, such as Wadeck, but by prison employees 
titled cook foremen. The cook supervisor job description 
also charges Wadeck with maintaining the accountability of 
inmates at all times and preventing passage of illegal drugs 
and weapons. 
 
Nothing about these supervisory duties, however, elevates 
Wadeck's duties to guarding. Although the government and 
the District Court frequently equate supervision with 
guarding, this conflation of terms is not enough to support 
the legal conclusion that Wadeck spent a significant 
amount of time guarding prisoners. It is not surprising that 
in a prison, where security is of paramount importance to 
every employee, each employee would have some 
supervisory obligations directed toward effecting that 
primary end. This general responsibility, divided among the 
USP-Lewisburg staff as specific tasks, cannot, however, be 
used to bootstrap Wadeck into Official Victim status for 
sentencing guidelines purposes. 
 
That leaves the first security duty--ensuring that inmates 
assigned to work in the kitchen are at their assigned 
station during working hours--as a ground upon which to 
find a S3A1.2(b) enhancement under the prior panel's 
second criterion. Cook supervisors, with and without the 
assistance of corrections officers, perform three"counts" 
during each shift on which they work to insure that each 
inmate is present. This duty, making sure that each inmate 
is at his station, serves two purposes. First, food does not 
get served if an inmate fails to report to his position and 
stay working there diligently. Second, the fact that a 
prisoner is not at his station could mean that he is 
attempting to escape. The first purpose is a concern of any 
kitchen manager and does not make the act of counting, 
guarding. Acting to effect the second purpose can 
constitute guarding, but there is no evidence in the 
sentencing hearing record establishing that cook 
supervisors at USP-Lewisburg spend a significant amount 
of time counting prisoners and preventing escape. These 
discrete acts of guarding, when understood in the context 
of Wadeck's other duties, are not enough to justify an 
Official Victim enhancement under the prior panel's 
definition. 
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Accordingly, for the reasons detailed in this Section, we 
conclude that the District Court erred as a matter of law in 
finding that Wadeck spent a significant amount of time 
guarding prisoners, as the prior panel defined that term. 
See Bennett, 161 F.3d at 190 (defining our plenary 
standard of review over the legal component of sentencing 
guideline issues). 
 
B. 
 
Having determined that Wadeck did not spend a 
significant amount of time guarding prisoners, we turn our 
attention to the prior panel's third criterion for applying 
S 3A1.2(b)--i.e., whether Wadeck was guarding prisoners at 
the time Walker assaulted him. The District Court held that 
"Wadeck was assaulted by Walker while actually engaged in 
guarding prisoners," but gave no explanation why this was 
the case. Walker, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 833. The only evidence 
of what Wadeck was doing at the time Walker struck him 
from behind is contained in Wadeck's testimony at the 
resentencing hearing. This testimony shows that when 
Walker surprised him Wadeck was not guarding anyone; 
instead it shows that Wadeck was, in essence, running an 
errand: 
 
       Q: Mr. Wadeck what were you doing at the time Mr. 
       Walker assaulted you? 
 
       A: I was getting food trays to send down to 
       segregation. 
 
       Q: At that time were you supervising inmates? 
 
       A: At that time when I walked back I was coming off 
       the line during feeding, and I was supervising inmates 
       that were--actually they were coming to eat, and I just 
       had to run back and get some trays; there was nobody 
       else back there at the time. 
 
Appendix at 62-63 (testimony of Wadeck, being questioned 
by government on direct examination) (emphasis added). 
 
       Q: Now at the time Mr. Walker assaulted you, I 
       believe that you said you were getting food trays and 
       taking them to G block. 
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       A: Right, it was either G block or segregation that 
       called. 
 
       . . . 
 
       Q: So were you actually carrying the trays up there? 
 
       A: No, I wasn't, I was going back in the area where 
       they prepare the trays. There was a hallway there with 
       an opening in the door. I was standing in there 
       informing the two individuals that were in there that I 
       needed five more trays, and at that time I felt 
       something on the back of my head. 
 
Appendix at 77-78 (testimony of Wadeck, being questioned 
by Walker on cross examination). 
 
Not even an extremely generous reading of this testimony 
supports the conclusion that when assaulted Wadeck was 
engaged in the act of guarding as that term is defined 
repeatedly above. Had Wadeck been performing a count, 
breaking up an inmate fight, or working as a corrections 
officer when assaulted,10 we could reach the opposite 
conclusion. On this record, however, we cannot. Wadeck 
was performing the type of task that led us to conclude in 
the last Section that he does not spend a significant 
amount of time guarding prisoners, but rather spends his 
time insuring that meals are prepared and served 
effectively. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court 
erred as a matter of law in relying on this third criterion of 
the prior panel's disjunctive three-part test to enhance 
Walker's sentence under S 3A1.2(b). 
 
III. 
 
Because we conclude that Wadeck was not titled a 
corrections officer, that he did not spent significant time 
guarding prisoners, and that he was not guarding Walker 
at the time he was struck by Walker, we hold that the 
District Court erroneously enhanced Walker's sentence 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Some cook supervisors work overtime as corrections officers. Wadeck 
has done this type of work in the past, but the record does not indicate 
how many hours he has worked as a corrections officer. At all events, he 
was not working as a corrections officer when assaulted by Walker. 
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under S 3A1.2(b). We will, therefore, vacate the judgment of 
the District Court and remand with instructions that 
Walker be resentenced without an enhancement based on 
the Official Victim guideline contained in S 3A1.2(b).11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Although we need not reach the issue, we note the possibility that 
Walker's sentence could also be vacated on the grounds that the District 
Court did not make specific findings of fact or law with respect to 
S 3A1.2(b)'s mens rea requirement. The guideline requires that the 
defendant "know[ ] or hav[e] reasonable cause to believe that [the victim] 
was a law enforcement or corrections officer . . .." U.S.S.G. S 3A1.2(b). 
At his original sentencing hearing, Walker referred to Wadeck as a "cop," 
suggesting both that he knew or had reason to know that Wadeck was 
a corrections officer as the prior panel defined that term, and that he 
therefore harbored the requisite criminal intent when he assaulted 
Wadeck. The prior panel mentioned this fact, but did not rule that this 
statement disposed of the mens rea issue when remanding for 
resentencing. See Walker, 149 F.3d at 242-43. In its resentencing 
memorandum, the District Court did not refer to Walker's testimony, and 
it made no factual or legal rulings regarding the intent element of 
S 3A1.2(b). In their absence, we are deprived of factual or legal 
conclusions to review on appeal. 
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GARTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
This appeal seeks an answer to the question -- when is 
a prison Cook Supervisor not a prison Corrections Officer? 
My answer to that question, in the present context, differs 
dramatically from the majority's answer -- my answer is 
never! 
 
The majority's opinion holds that, pursuant to the 
definition set forth by an earlier panel of this court, United 
States v. Walker, 149 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 1998) ("Walker I"), 
Cook Supervisor Wadeck, who was assaulted by the 
appellant Walker, neither was, nor is a Corrections Officer.1 
In reaching this decision, the majority displays, as Justice 
Frankfurter stated, "ignor[ance] as judges of what we know 
as men." Watts v. State of Indiana, 388 U.S. 49, 52 (1949). 
It has set aside its understanding of the most basic and 
fundamental aspect of prison life: that prisons are 
essentially composed of two distinct groups of individuals 
-- those who are imprisoned and those who are charged 
with guarding the prisoners. Clearly, Walker is a prisoner. 
Just as clearly, Wadeck -- whose primary responsibility as 
a Cook Supervisor is to supervise prisoners in preparing 
food and to ensure that the inmates are fed -- also has a 
simultaneous secondary responsibility to guard the 
prisoners. 
 
This latter responsibility, whether discharged by a Cook 
Supervisor, a prison engineer, a prison maintenance or 
equipment manager, or others who have prime 
responsibilities, requires these prison personnel to prevent 
prisoner escapes, and to prevent violations of prison rules, 
just as it requires them to perform all and every function 
entailed in guarding the prison population. Hence, Wadeck, 
as a Cook Supervisor, simultaneously bears not only the 
responsibility to ensure that the inmates are fed, but also 
bears the ongoing and continuous responsibility to guard 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In Walker I, for purposes of S 3A1.2(b) of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines, we defined "corrections officer" as "any person so titled, any 
person, however, titled, who spends significant time guarding prisoners 
within a jail or correctional institution or in transit to or from or 
within 
a jail or correctional institution, and all other persons assaulted while 
actually engaged in guarding prisoners." 
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these very prisoners. As such, he must necessarily be 
regarded as a Corrections Officer. To conclude that Cook 
Supervisor Wadeck is not a Corrections Officer is, as I have 
just indicated, to ignore what we know as a matter of 
common sense, and to construe Wadeck's position without 
reference to either his overall prison responsibilities or our 
general knowledge of the way prisons operate. 
 
The district court found that "Wadeck routinely 
supervises inmates during their employment, is responsible 
for ensuring that they are present during work hours, and 
is responsible for safety, security and discipline of inmates 
under his supervision." United States v. Walker, 30 F. 
Supp. 2d 829, 833 (M.D. Pa. 1998). Wadeck received 
specialized training for his position, including training in 
security and self-defense. Stationed throughout most of the 
penitentiary are correctional officers to guard the prisoners; 
however, -- and this is most significant to me-- no other 
Corrections Officers styled as such are regularly posted in 
the kitchen area. Although Corrections Officers gather in 
the dining hall for security purposes, they are not present 
in any other part of the kitchen either during or between 
meals, leaving the maintenance of kitchen security solely to 
those such as Cook Supervisor Wadeck.2  It is Wadeck and 
other Cook Supervisors who make sure that the doors and 
grills are locked, search for contraband, prevent prisoners 
from escaping, and take action to prevent violations of 
prison rules. In the past Wadeck himself has responded to 
emergencies and reported violations. 
 
Cook Supervisors such as Wadeck help monitor and 
account for the whereabouts of prisoners assigned to their 
department, and directly supervise prisoners employed in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The district court found, for example, that:"Between 11:00 p.m. and 
7:00 a.m., there is only one Cook Supervisor on duty to supervise 16 
inmates without any other BOP employees, including Corrections Officers, 
present in the kitchen area." Walker I, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 832 (emphasis 
added). 
 
The district court also found that: "While Corrections Officers stand 
main line, they are not stationed in any other part of the kitchen area 
either during meals or between meals, and security is left to the Food 
Service Department." Id. 
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the kitchen. And, although Cook Supervisors are not styled 
Corrections Officers, they wear dark blue uniforms to which 
are affixed the Bureau of Prisons emblem, wear duty belts, 
receive specialized training in security matters that are 
unique to Food Services (such as knowledge of food 
products that can be utilized in the making of controlled or 
prohibited substances, such as alcohol), and are 
responsible for reporting any missing inmates to 
correctional officers.3 Cook Supervisors are also authorized 
to pursue, arrest or detain escapees. Indeed, the district 
court found that Cook Supervisors also qualify for early 
retirement benefits as a "law enforcement officer" because, 
in addition to their food-related responsibilities, they share 
many of the duties of correctional officers. Finally, the 
district court also based its conclusion on the premise that 
Walker assaulted Wadeck while Wadeck was engaged in 
guarding prisoners.4 
 
Walker does not contest the district court's factual 
findings, but rather only its legal conclusion that those 
facts were sufficient to establish that Wadeck was a 
Corrections Officer within the meaning of Walker I. We 
"exercise plenary review over legal questions about the 
meaning of the sentencing guidelines, but apply the 
deferential clearly erroneous standard to factual 
determinations underlying their application." United States 
v. Inigo, 925 F.2d 641, 658 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
The majority's opinion attempts to tailor the subset of 
prison employees that qualify as Corrections Officers based 
on the significance of the amount of time they spend 
guarding prisoners. In this endeavor, I believe the majority 
has erroneously and unnecessarily excluded from those 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Employees specifically entitled "correctional officers" are employed at 
the penitentiary. But, we have not limited the definition of Corrections 
Officers, for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines, to only those so 
entitled. See United States v. Walker, 149 F.3d 238, 242 (3d Cir. 1998). 
Our definition also included "any person, . . . however titled, who spends 
significant time guarding prisoners . . . and all other persons assaulted 
while actually engaged in guarding prisoners." Id. 
 
4. Just prior to Walker's attack, in his supervisory role Wadeck was 
directing two prisoner-workers as to the number of food trays he needed 
prepared. 
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discharging the functions of Corrections Officers all but 
those who are actually entitled Corrections Officers, and 
those employees such as lieutenants who instruct others to 
conduct shakedowns, security officers, locksmith officers, 
armory officers, senior officers, senior officer specialists, 
special investigative agents and correctional counselors. 
(Majority Op. at 13). Wadeck's food preparation activities 
should not be construed to diminish the significant time he 
spends in guarding prisoners. 
 
The majority places too much weight on the fact that any 
prison employee would be expected to respond to inmate 
fights or emergencies, write up inmates for violations, and 
make themselves available to prisoners with problems or 
complaints should the situation arise. Id. at 14. Although it 
is true that in some manner all employees share the 
responsibilities of prison security, my colleagues ignore the 
fact that unlike internal office prison personnel, for 
example, Corrections Officers including Cook Supervisors 
are constantly and continuously engaged in these duties. It 
makes no sense for the majority to discount the importance 
of the duties required of a Cook Supervisor merely because 
some other employees might on a rare occasion assume 
them as well. Nor is this analysis changed by the fact that, 
as the majority notes, it is cook foremen rather than Cook 
Supervisors who conduct shakedowns. (Id. at 15). The 
majority did not feel the need to eliminate armory officers, 
locksmith officers, special investigative agents, correctional 
counselors and others from its list of those who would 
qualify as Corrections Officers merely because another 
prison official conducts the shakedowns. Similarly and as a 
matter of logic, neither should Cook Supervisors fail to 
qualify as Corrections Officers on this basis. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. As I read 
the record, Walker I, and the district court's findings of fact, 
the district court correctly categorized Wadeck as a 
Corrections Officer, and therefore properly enhanced 
Walker's sentence to reflect Wadeck's status as an official 
victim.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The "Official Victim" provision of section 3A1.2 of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines provides that: 
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As a second matter, the majority also addresses the issue 
of whether we should remand this case for resentencing of 
Walker because the majority charges that the district court 
failed to make specific findings of fact with respect to 
Walker's knowledge of Wadeck's status as a Corrections 
Officer. We must recognize, however, that our mandate to 
the district court on remand in Walker I was to conduct 
"further fact-finding and, applying our definition of 
corrections officer, see if Walker is subject to the section 
3A1.2(b) `Official Victim' enhancement [of three levels]." 
Walker, 149 F.3d at 243. It appears to me that the district 
court made no point of Walker's knowledge because our 
earlier opinion (Walker I) itself referred to Walker's 
admission during his testimony that Wadeck was "a cop." 
Id. at 242. Indeed, a review of the record reveals this telling 
admission.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       If-- 
 
       (a) the victim was a government officer or employee; a former 
       government officer or employee; or a member of the immediate 
       family of any of the above, and the offense of conviction was 
       motivated by such status, or 
 
       (b) during the course of the offense or immediateflight therefrom, 
       the defendant or a person for whose conduct the defendant is 
       otherwise accountable, knowing or having reasonable cause to 
       believe that a person was a law enforcement or corrections 
       officer, assaulted such officer in a manner creating a 
       substantial risk of serious bodily injury, 
 
       increase by 3 levels. U.S.S.G. S 3A1.2. 
 
6. During the Sentencing, the following exchange occurred between 
Walker and his counsel: 
 
       Q: If Mr. Wadeck had been an inmate and called you a punk, what 
       would you have done 
 
       A: I would have tried to kill him. 
 
       Q: You didn't try to kill Mr. Wadeck, did you? 
 
       A: No, he was a cop. 
 
Sentencing Hearing Transcript at 8. 
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Further, given the uniforms worn by Cook Supervisors, 
the security measures taken by Cook Supervisors -- 
including searching for contraband items, checking the 
security in the kitchen and monitoring prisoners -- Walker 
had to have been aware that Wadeck was a Corrections 
Officer, even if not formally titled as such. Certainly, he 
knew that Wadeck was not a prisoner. Although the district 
court understandably made no explicit finding with regard 
to Walker's knowledge, presumably in light of our mandate, 
I am satisfied that the government's burden as to this 
requirement was satisfied as well. 
 
I would hold that Wadeck was a Corrections Officer; that 
Walker knew he was; and that the district court did not err 
in enhancing Walker's sentence. Because the majority holds 
otherwise, I respectfully dissent. 
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